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Strategies of Ethnic Survival in Central America
Richard N. Adams
1. Introduction: The State and Ethnic Relations
This paper will consider the state, in Weberian tenns, to be a government-
centered network of public power relations that makes decisions and administers for
the benefit, the welfare, and the survival of all its members. Ethnicities are, of course,
subgroups of members who use the ethnicity 10seek their own collective interests. In
the ideal world, the state would seek 10negotiate the conflicting interests of the various
ethnicities for the benefit of all.
At the outset, there is a basic conflict between the state and all ethnicities
housed therein except that which roles the state. The best interests of the whole (the
perspective of the state) can rarely be congruent with the best interests of a single eth-
nicity. Most states are "ethnocratic," that is, they are controlled by a particular
ethnicity.1 In ethnocracies, the interests of all other ethnicities tend to be subordinated,
thus creating conflicts that cannot always be readily distinguished from the structural
conflicts inherent in the operation of the state.
The ladinos, who have long dominated the Mesoamerican states, are divided
between those who, on the one hand, favor a rigorous Liberal policy to achieve labor
control through forced deculturation and social control based directIy on threat of force
(as exemplified by the Barrios regime of the l870s), and those who, on the other hand,
favor an indigenista policy,2 also Liberal-inspired, but designed to obtain the
confonnance of Indians to labor control s through "civilizing" and "educating" them.
What is cornmon 10both policies is the wish to get Indians to conform to the interests
of the dominant ladinos. All Central American states except Belize are clearly
ethnocratically controlled by mestizo sectors. They differ in the extent to which the
interests of subordinate ethnicities are ignored or marginalized.
If the ideally neutral state cannot exist, something like it may be found where
the central government's interests differ from those of a regionally dominant ethnicity.
:;
Two cases will illustrate: Mayan-Iadino relations in Chiapas, Mexico, and Kuna-
mestizo relations in Panama.
The regional ethnic situation in Chiapas, Mexico, is a historical continuation of
the ladino- Indian relational system of the westem highlands of Guatemala. The
Mexican Revolution, however, changed the priorities of the Mexican national state.
The sometimes violent ethnic conflicts historically characteristic of Mexico,
Guatemala, and El Salvador were seen to be counter to the development of the national
state. The national govemment's priorities, therefore, sought to lessen regional ethnic
conflicts throughout Mexico, including those generated by ethnic problems in
Chiapas, by advocating an almost aggressive indigenista policy. The Mexican state,
thereby, appeared in a somewhat neutral role, trying to balance the interests of the two
major ethnicities of the region.
The Kuna of Pan ama have for over fifty years enjoyed a negotiated
autonomous relationship with the govemment of Panama.3 This has given them
considerable control over the Comarca granted them by the govemment as well as
access to the government in Panama City. They have been able to defend much oftheir
land from the incursions of the expanding campesino population. This autonomy has
been accompanied by a level of ethnic solidarity that is not enjoyed by any other
indigenous ethnicity in Panama. Bourgeois has provided a useful comparison of the
ethnic relations of the Guayrní on the one hand, and the Kuna, on the other, with the
administration of the banana plantations in Bocos del Toro.4 The Kuna work on the
plantation as temporary migrants but have consistentIy been under the control of Kuna
leaders. They have enjoyed occupational benefits in terms of jobs held and living
conditions that the Guayrní have uniformIy failed to achieve. The reasons are complex,
but clearly the advantages enjoyed by the Kuna derive in part from their initial and
continuing negotiated relationship with the central government.
The ethnic state relations just cited are cases in which the ethnicity líes within
the territorial bounds of the state. Since ethnicities are separate and somewhat
autonomous entities, they can, and not infrequently do, have relations with other
states. The United States has entered the scene in this capacity in a number of
instances that will be discussed later in terms of "third-party derivative power."
1950 1950 1964 1964 1981 1981
Departrncnt Total Pcrcent Total Percent Total Percent
Popo In<lian Popo Indian Popo Indian
Totonicapan 99,434 96.6 142,873 94.2 204,419 97.1
Sololá 82,869 93.8 107,429 93.1 154,249 94.2
Alta Verapaz 188,758 93.4 263,160 92.0 322,008 89.4
El Quiché 174,882 83.7 255,280 84.9 328,175 85.2
Chimaltcnango 122,310 77.5 161,760 76.1 230,059 79.8
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2 . Ecological Factors in Ethnic Survival
Central America presents widely divergent ecologies within which ethnicities
and the state contend for their respective survival. These are conditions that need to be
examined first because the strategies for survival must operate within the contraints
they impose.
Demographic variabLes. Population size is, in the long ron, perhaps the most
important single factor that determines the Darwinian process. Large populations can
afford large losses and still survive. Small populations obviously cannot.
The very size of the indigenous population of Guatemala-three to five
million, depending on who is counting-is a long-ron advantage unmatched anywhere
else in the hemisphere. There is a great discrepancy in the estimates of the size of this
twentieth-century population. Proindigenous advocates have claimed that as much as
85 percent of the population is "Indian," and they would surely be right if everyone
with an indigenous ancestor were included. If, however, we are referring to people
who identify themselves as members of an indigenous ethnicity, then the figure could
not hold.
The censuses give some figures that suggest a decelerating decline in the total
population. While the basis of census judgments is notorious, nevertheless I suspect
that their figures are closer to some kind of social truth than claims based on ancestry.
What is of much greater importance, however, is that four of the five departments with
the highest percentage of Indian population manifested an increase in the proportion of
Indians over the last intercensus periodoThis means that in the westem highlands there
is a core area where the Indian population is becoming
Census Total Population Indian Population Percent
Year Indian
1950 2,788,122 1,491,725 53.5
1964 4,245,176 1,842,802 43.3
1981 6,054,227 2,536,523 41.9
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stronger. It seems likely that the northern part of Quetzaltenango and San Marcos, and
southern Huehuetenango, are part of this area, were it possible to separate out the
figures. It is here that Carol Smith locates her cornmercial core of Indian development,
and in two of these departments (El Quiché and Chimaltenango) the greatest loss of
Indian life was sustained in the 1979-84 periodo
While in the overall picture there may be a slow decline in the Indian
proportion of the national population, it is quite overbalanced by two facts: the rate of
decline is decreasing and may level off, and the rate of absolute growth is accelerating
markedly. This picture suggests that the future of Guatemala may well see a
















While no one has any real idea how many indigenous peoples remain in El
Salvador, Baron Castro estimated a total of 375,000 in 1940,6 Adams possibly as
high as 400,000 in the early 1950s,7 and Maxwell possibly 367,500 Nahuat-Pipil
speakers in the early 1980s.8 A report prepared by the Ministerio de Cultura y
Comunicaciones in 1985, asserted that 9 percent of the national population, or
approximately 450,000 people, were Indian.9 Adrián Esquino, a Nahuat from El
Salvador interviewed in 1987, claimed that 36 percent of the population was Indian.1O
The issue is, as always, complicated by the question of how they ultimately identify
and define themselves. That so many Indians can remain in a clandestine state, where
much of the Salvadoran population seems unaware of their presence, is possible in
part because they are a marked minority in the population at large-probably not more
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than 20 pcrcent, and likely less. In comparison, the Guatemalan Indians constitute
easily one-half of the national population.
The importance of the Guatemalan Indian expansion, however, can be seen
when we compare figures with neighboring Honduras, where between 1778 and
1980, the lndian population increased from only 88,000 to 178,500, dropping from
67.4 percent to 4.6 percent of the total population. Quite clearly, the Guatemalan
Indians' economic and agrarian plight poses an infinitely greater threat to the state than
is the case in Honduras.
The very small numbers involved in Costa Rica clearly make the Indians of that
country totally subordinate to the decisions of the state; serious overt opposition can be
little more than symbolic. In contrast, any suggestion of serious political activity by
Indians in Guatemala or El Salvador instantly causes anxiety in the ladino ethnocratic
state. The Miskito on the Nicaraguan Atlantic coast posed a threat to the emerging
Sandinista state only in part because of their absolute numbers-upward of 80,000.
They are a major part of the Atlantic regional population. The neighboring Sumu-
perhaps 4,000-take on political importance only in company with the Miskito. And
the Rama are more important to the Sandinistas for their symbolic worth than because
of any serious threat they pose to the state. Indeed, the Atlantic coastal indigenous
population constitutes only a small part of the total population. In relative terms,
however, it is very important, since it composes a quarter of the total population in a
regíon of effectively no roads and poor cornmunication.
Environmental variables. The Spanish colonial aversion for the tropics was
important in Central American history. Although the Mexican tropical Caribbean coast
was dominated early, the first settlements in Central America were in the highlands
and on the Pacific coast. After this they slowed down and occupied the Atlantic
lowlands gradually or not at all. Efforts to extend military and evangelical hegemony
over the (now) Nicaraguan and Honduran Atlantic coasts were achieved by dreary
results. Conquerors entered and departed, leaving disease and genes, but no colonies;
missions were established, experienced short lives, and then were driven out or
abandoned. The Spanish conquerors seemed to prefer a somewhat arid climate, the
Guatemalan Oriente and neighboring Sonsonate, the "colonial core" area delineated by
Lutz and Lovell.11 The highlands were difficult and cold, the Atlantic coast damp and
hot.
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In the annals of western colonial expansion, the notion that a region is "empty"
usually has meant that westerners simply have not found it attractive enough to enter,
exploit, or colonize. It has also meant that the colonizers did not think the resident
aboriginal inhabitants were worthy of mention.
While obviously varying with the topography and the technology of transport,
geographical distance is a major factor in the degree to which an ethnicity is accessible
to state control. It is difficult to be much concerned about a group that is distant in a
region that is of no particular economic or political value to the state.
Through the nineteenth century, the Atlantic coast and its human inhabitants
were of liule interest to the Hispanophone populations of the Central American
highlands and west coast. So slight was the interest that the standing dispute between
Guatemala and the United Kingdom over Belize was left unresolved, and the national
boundary between Nicaragua and Honduras was not finally settled until early 1960.
Indeed, travel in Central America was generally difficult until after World War TI;in
the mid-nineteenth century it still required more than a week to travel from Puerto
Barrios to Guatemala City, and to travel through Central America usually warranted a
book.12
Indeed, until World War 11,one of the few times the Nicaraguan state had
shown Ínterest in the Atlantic coast was when Sandino tried to obtain the cooperation
of the Miskito in his cause in the 1930s.13 After British interest subsided in the
nineteenth century, Honduras tended to ignore all but the banana-growing regions.
When, in the mid-1950s, the boundary dispute with Nicaragua heated up again, the
only regional response was for both governments to rush public health programs into
the region, apparently to show that they had really cared a11along.14
While the Atlantic coast has been the major area of Central America to have
benefited from this "distance" in recent years, it should be recalled that the aboriginal
peoples of northwestern and northern Guatemala also benefited from delayed Spanish
conquest. It is only in recent decades that serious entries have been made into the
Darien.
For isolated groups ethnic identity is a relatively' marginal concern. It becomes
important when contact with other societies--ethnicities--poses some kind of threat to
one's identity or survival. Therefore, the expansion of, first, indigenous, then
colonial, and, most recen tIy, nation-states has constantly reduced the time and space
between societies. Maintaining self-identity has emerged as a central problem as
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marginal peoples have been swept up by expanding state interests and demo-economic
pressures. In a sense, the Miskito perceived no threat to their ethnic identity until
successful revolutionary leaders tried to win them to the cause.
3 . State Strategies in Dealing with Ethnicities
Superior military force and strategy. Every state has resources that provide
overwhelming advantages over the individuals and groupings that make up its domain.
First among these is the control of force. While Weber argued that the state had the
sole legitimate use of force, history has demonstrated that the definition of what is
accepted as legitimate often varies with who controls the force. Weberian legitimacy,
therefore, is one result of the fact of the state's superior force.
Since the end ofWorld War 11,the major use of armed force-military, police,
state, and private terrorist groups-in Central America has been to obtain conforming
behavior in the national population. There have been no Central American wars in
spite of external attempts to create them. Rather, the armies of Guatemala, El
Salvador, Nicaragua, and, briefly, Honduras have been used to fight insurgency and,
in some instances, to terrorize the civilian population.
Both Guatemala and El Salvador have a constant fear of polítical opposition
among Indians and have thus periodically resorted to the use of force to scare them
into quiescence. The extent and intensity of the use of force has varied. In El
Salvador, certainly with the 1932 slaughter but perhaps before,15 ethnocide has been
the effective and overt (although perhaps not stated) policy. Labor was needed, but
Salvadoran coffee labor has for years been effectively worked by mobilizing
individual s apart from family units.
While the killing of Indians in Guatemala and El Salvador has always been
accepted by the state as an appropriate way to deal with their opposition, it is my
impression that the wholesale slaughter of the 1979-84 era marked a turn toward
genocide. It is difficult to interpret such a holocaust as merely an attempt to kill
political subversives. It has been argued that a desire to eliminate Indians from
agriculturallands was involved, as the slaughter also succeeded in driving people into
refuge in Mexico, separating many of them from their land. An urban ladino engaged
in agricultural production reflected this view by saying, "We will not have peace or
progress in this country until we reduce them from four million to two."16
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The effect on the Indians of Guatemala has been a superficial retreat into
political confonnance. The events of the past decades are, however, irnmediate and
fresh in the memories of certainly hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Indians,
and they are aware of the role of the state in perpetrating the violence.
Setting a national agenda. While the recourse to force is the ultimate and
always potential basis of state control, it is not the one to which most people usually
respond, since the constant use of force is, ultimately, self-destructive. The intelligent
state (always supposing there is one) seeks to control the wider environment so that
people find it convenient to make decisions that confonn to desired policies. This is
achieved through all sorts of laws, regulations, and practices that may be summed up
as the setting of the national agenda.17
Since liberal interests first prevailed in Central America with independence, the
national agendas have consistently been oriented toward greater or lesser national
development. In no country of the Isthmus have the specific interests of indigenous
ethnicities been explicitly defended in the enunciation of these national agendas.
Indians, if inc1uded, have always been categorized as part of the nationallabor force,
and state language concerning them is usua11yin tenns that hide the ethnic issue behind
some nonethnic usage such as "mano de obra," "campesinos," or "jornaleros." This
was as true of the Guatemalan revolutionary governments of 1944-54 as of their
predecessors and successors.18
In the post-World War TIera it was the magic of "development" that provided
the context for promoting the state's interests instead of those of the Indian
populations. This continues today, although in many respects the intervening years
have modulated efforts to give apparent recognition to indigenous interests. Planning
and policies are always in accord with the perceived interests of the larger state.
The role of emerging Mayan bourgeois, educated, and professionally trained
individual s of Indian extraction is unquestionably important in the emergence of the
national-level consciousness of the Indian population. It has, however, yet to make
much of a mark on the setting of the national agenda. Indian politicians are having
some influence within the national Congress, but there are few of them, and their
efforts are constricted to limited areas. To date, unfortunately, the most obvious effect
of Indian political action has been to contri bute to the insurgency that brought about
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the 1979-84 holocaust. Indians are, therefore, very apprehensive about being too
politically visible.
Control oi the economy. An important source of state power is the ability to
manipulate the flow and distribution of goods, money, and services needed by the
population and by the agencies of the state itself. While in the world at large this varies
greatly between socialist and capitalist nation-states, in Central America only
Nicaragua has made any attempt to institute an overtly socialist regime. Even there,
however, the capitalist agenda still operates.
Subordinate ethnicities generally suffer from the free operation of capitalist
economies. Since non-Indians are usually most strategically located in the national
field, they usually gain at the expense of the others. Nondominant ethnicities are rarely
in a favorable strategic position and seldom are powerful enough to be favored by the
operation of the market. There are some major counteractions under way, however,
and they will be taken up below, in the discussion of economic expansion.
State integration. In their dealings with nondominant ethnicities, states usually
favor one of three rather different strategies of control: encapsulation, assimilation, or
extermination.
In spite of recent events in Guatemala, genocide is rarely an overt policy, and
is seldom even the favored policy. It may be resorted to when nondominant ethnicities
not only seem to hold no promise of being harnessed into the state agenda, but pose a
real obstacle to those goals. Such was the case, for example, in the extermination of
Indians in the western expansion of the United States, and in the Argentine "conquista
del desierto." It is arguable whether at some point such a goal was involved in the
Guatemalan military policy in the northwest highlands in the 1979-1984 periodo
Overt policies and efforts to deculturate and assimilate are milder, and more
common, responses to the same perspective that can lead to extermination. Reference
has already been made to the case of El Salvador, and similar efforts have taken place
from time to time in Guatemala. Often, however, integration takes place less in
response to specific governmental intent than as a result of ongoing state-supported
capitalist activity. Thus, indigenous communities that were characterized as
"ladinoized" in the earIy 1950s (barrios in Guazacapán and Chilquimulilla,
Acasaguastlán in Guatemala, Panchimalco and Izaleo in El Salvador, Subtiaba and
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Monimbó in Nicaragua, and Matambú in Costa Rica) have been losing their Indian
basis of identity through being forced to compete under unfavorable conditions with
expanding ladino/mestizo sectors of the national society.19 Ethnic reawakening has
occurred where a poli tical opening presented itself (i.e., in Subtiaba and Monimbó).
The indigenista policies that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century were,
among other things, a way of achieving liberal goals without such violent side effects.
These policies became the hallmark of progressive thinking on the part of liberal and
revolutionary govemment well into the second half of the present century. They have
so dominated the thinking of citizens and politicians alike in Guatemala that even after
the terrifying mas sacre in Patzicia in 1944, the newspapers avoided the economic and
political problems confronted by the indigenous population in favor of editoríals
calling for greater indigenista measures-more education, health, literacy, and, in
general, civilization of the Indian.20
The only mode of integration that really permits some kind of cultural
autonomy also involves the geographical encapsulation of the ethnicity, or some
significant portion of it, by the state. The Comarca system of the Kuna, or the
reservations set up in Costa Rica and, apparently less effectively, in Honduras, are of
this kind and, whether meeting the approval of outsiders or not, are usually welcomed
by the indigenous population as the best of the poor altematives that existo The most
favored altemative from the Indian perspective--complete autonomy-is not likely to
be allowed under the general conduct of nation-states.
Rather, the setting aside of a territory in which the indigenous group has
certain ríghts that are not enjoyed by others and is provided with some degree of
autonomy is probably the most that such ethnicities can hope to gain within the
contemporary nation-state system. Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama have all set
land aside for Indian groups. Their success varíes, of course. Honduran Indians have
suffered encroachments on their lands even with legal protection.21 In Costa Rica the
status of indigenous reserves varíes. In general they are probably better off than
elsewhere, but they also suffer from encroachments and crowding caused by the
growing indigenous population.22 In Panama, we have already alluded to the Kuna.
Much more vulnerable are the Guaymí, who have not succeeded in finding a legal
relationship of autonomy with the state, and the Chocó, who are themselves often
intruders into new lands.23
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4. Indigenous Ethnic Strategies for Survival
Given the overwhelming advantages that states enjoy over unfavored
ethnicities, it is surprising not only that the latter have continued to exercise a decisive
role historically, but that they have been emerging into ever greater prominence in
recent decades. They do exist, however, and they repeatedly come into being because
they are one of the very few kinds of large human organizations that can exert a strong
psychological c1aim on individuals. In order to do this, they must maintain strong
solidarity. That in turn requires that they retain active control over the cultural and
symbolic elements that constitute the external signals or markers of their self-
identification.
The process of ethnic identity is so complex that the tools of a single discipline
cannot begin to penetrate it. Social anthropology24 is particularly interested in the
external markers and symbolic vehic1es that provide the focus of an individual's and,
therefore, of the collectivity's, identification. A great variety of things serve this
purpose. History, however, is a naturally selective process that has ascertained that
certain of these are particuarly effective in keeping ethnicities together. A common
language, control over territory, some degree of endogamy, and selected ritual s seem
to have been especially effective.
Control of language. Perhaps the most commonly cited ethnic marker is
language, and there is no question that the loss of language signals not onIy the loss of
basic tools of self-expression, but also much of the cognitive framework that depends
on the persistence of those forrns. For almost all Central American ethnicities,
language is a major concern. For many Guatemalan Indians, diverse in their Mayan
languages and dialects, the indigenous language, lengua, remains the language. While
there is a great deal of bilingualism, especially among males, linguistic chauvinism is
also developing among some of the more urbanized components. The Academia Maya
Quiché has come into being specifically to defend the purity of Quiché. Similar groups
for other languages are also active.
In the Nicaraguan government's efforts to strengthen the central symbolic core
of the Atlantic coastal Indians, considerable work has been directed te writing in
Miskito, Sumu, and Rama. The case of the Rama-perhaps 650 people-a fragile
surviving ethnicity located on the southern Atlantic coast, is particularly instructive.
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They have split into at least two components, one composed of town dwellers, the
other those who live in the bush. Recent work by Colette Craig suggests that these
two groups split in terrns of adaptation to the more complex coastal scene. The
townspeople almost total1y lost the Rama language and, indeed, assumed in general
that it was all but lost except possibly among those in the bush. Craig not only
succeeded in recording and analyzing the Rama language but, with the firm support of
the Nicaraguan authorities, is currently involved in attempting to reacquaint the town
dwellers with their linguistic inheritance. This is certainly one of the few (if not the
only) cases of a state taking such pains to reconfirrn the ethnicity of a language that is
on the verge of extinction.25
Control oi territory. If language is perhaps the most central symbolic feature
among possible foei of ethnic identity, control of basic resources certainly is the
feature of greatest importance from the point of view of material selection. A great deal
has been written about the special meaning that many indigenous groups attach to the
land, and there is no question but that it has a special place within the symbolic
repertory. Stephen Gudeman has described in a most imaginative way how the
country people of Panama have undergone extreme changes in their model of the
world as their relative control over their land has changed.26
The sustaining issue in controlling territory is that it is also an economic
resource. In addition, however, the common dependence of a group of people on a
territorial resource is a strong basis for solidarity. Generational ties are tightened when
the inheritance of land is at stake.
Control over territory has successfully replaced language in some cases of
solidarity. In the Montañas de Jalapa in eastern Guatemala there is a population that
firrnly asserts that it is indigenous, but it has not retained an Indian language. The
people of the indigenous barrio of Subtiaba in León, Nicaragua, firrnly assert their
c1aim over shrimp-producing waters along the coast as their common property.
Monimbo, the barrio of Masaya that was so active in the revolution, retains its
indigenous identification principally on the basis of cornmon territory.
Territory may playa number of roles for an ethnicity, but that crucially
concemed with identity need not play an economic roleoThe identification with a lost
or future homeland, for example, may have had, and might in the future have, some
economic significance, but for the moment is purely a central feature of identity.
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Control over community. While ethnic groups often find common residential
areas, it is also the case that the emergence of an ethnicity and its continued saliency is
very commonly marked by using residence as mechanism to retain exclusive control
over people and property. Residence also, therefore, becomes an important component
of the identity system. The range of importance and intensity of identification with a
community varíes broadly, but in Middle America perhaps the most famous theoretical
argument is Eric Wolfs concerning corporate (or "closed corporate") community.27
Wolf argued, in brief, that Mesoamerican Indians had used the community
organization as a way of protecting ethnic identity by tying control over communal
land, and religious and polítical activíty into a single social organization and ritual
programo "Community," of course, implies much more than merely an organized
aggregate of coresidents. It involves daily interactions and familiar patterned behavior,
internal factions and alliances, love and hatred, but with all, it also involved a
recognition of common good and, if necessary, common defense against outsiders. In
a generic sense, it is the minimal self-reproducing organization of the human
species.28
Control oi selected rituals. Social organization is constructed by standardizing
certain behaviors, ordering conduct and expectations so that one may predict the
actions of another. Some of these orderly behaviors act as critical symbols of the
ethnicity itself. Since most human behavior is fairly sloppy, it is important that some
things be done wíth particular care and be kept inviolate and protected from entropy.
Thus, some performance s are explicitIy ritualistic and are retained specifically as
devices to keep the system in order.
Besides (and in rare cases possibly in place of) the critical issues of language,
territory, and reproduction, ethnicities will ritualize certain social organizational forms
that then symbolize their distinctiveness. The use of such forms necessarily implies
social relations; their use affects not only the members of the collectivity, but equally
marks those who are thereby excluded.
All ethnic differences can potentially serve this function. When few
differentiating features are in evidence, our attention is particularly drawn 10the ritual
function. In El Salvador, the Indians' concern to camouflage their antecedents led
them to forgo some obvious and apparent features such as extensive use of costume. It
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was, however, much more difficult to shift languages, and that feature apparently
remains important today. In the 1950s some ladinoized communities of Guatemala,
such as Guazacapán and Chiquimulilla, had effectively lost a distinctive indigenous
language and significant territory. What remained were certain Catholic cults, religious
groups in which no ladinos participated. These served as self-identity markers for the
Indians and, at the same time, as externa! criteria for ladinos.
In ethnic communities that may otherwise be c1early distinct, such as in many
of the highland communities of Guatemala, there will also be certain traits that are
selected for special emphasis. The c1assiccase is the cajas de la comunidad, literally,
small chests carefully hidden in the church or elsewhere in which it is believed that the
land titles, often royal grants, are retained.29
Biological reproduction and expansion. In keeping with the Darwinian model,
probably the most successful of the strategies available to the nondominant ethnicities
is that of biological reproduction and expansion. Since most such groups in Central
America are rural cultivators and laborers, the most effective move in countering the
state is the expansion of the agrarian population and, where appropriate, its migratory
expansion into frontier areas. It is certainly the case that, while the expansion of the
Guatemalan Indian population has placed it in a somewhat precarious position in
facing an apprehensive state, its very numbers indicate that in the long run it will
occupy a much more important political and economic role than it does now. There is
no evidence of any overall indigenous population policy apart from that set by the
needs of peasant cultivators. The state, however, for its part has played host in trying
to establish population planning programs and has a1lowed the establishment of c1inics
and community-level workers to introduce family planning into communities, both
Indian and ladino.
It will be recalled that the Miskito policy of reproduction involves a readiness
to incorporate people of whatever genetic extraction; as long as the Miskito women
kept control of the household within the Miskito community, the need for common
ancestry and the inculcation of language and culture were met. The neighboring Sumu,
however, have long lived under the coastal hegemony of the Miskito, and during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries they, presumably along with other neighbors of
the Miskito, suffered severely from slaving attacks and loss of population.
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The "reproductive policy" of the Sumu, however, contrasts sharply with that
of the Miskito. Whereas the latter have easily incorporated alien peoples in contact, no
matter what the genetic composition, the Sumu have been more rigorous in retaining
biological purity. This has had the Darwinian disadvantage of keeping their numbers
low, but it also now allows them an easier basis of ethnic distinction from the Miskito,
who have so extensively Africanized. The separate identity has allowed them to act
independentIy of the Miskito in the recent autonomy process in Nicaragua.
The question of reproductive policy, as practiced, certainly can be a matter of
some importance in the retention of identity. Unlike the problem of lack of territory,
fictionalizing reproduction has few selective disadvantages. Marrying or mating with
an outsider provides children for the inside, no matter what the outsider may be. Since
the problem is common ancestry, it is not a difficult one. The number of ancestors
doubles in every ascending generation, and somewhere the appropriate individual is
likely to be found--or invented.
Economic expansion. Biological expansion, however, is not the only kind of
expansion. Equally significant is the emergence over the past century of a
commercially adept sector of Indians in the western central highlands of Guatemala.
Indians of the region that Carol Smith has called the "core" of the indigenous western
highlands,30 that area extending from Totonicapan on the east through Quetzaltenango
on the west, have for years been heavily engaged in commerce. In Quetzaltenango,
this has led to the emergence of an indigenous sector with a lifestyle clearly marked by
the accoutrements of western wealth. Along with this, Indians have increasingly taken
up professions, especially as educators. To characterize this population as an Indian
"bourgeoisie" may be true but also misleading, because, irrespective of their
consumption patterns, some have found a strong nativistic ideology around which a
c1earlypan-national Indian identity is currentIy forming. It was marked by a very high
degree of concentration on commerce. Indians in Quetzaltenango have become famous
for their central position in the municipal and regional economy, and some have
become extremely wealthy, being known as millionaires and sporting all the symbols
of bourgeois wealth. Equally important, however, has been the econornic success that
has enabled some Indians to pursue professional training through university degrees.
At the eastern end of this region, close 10Guatemala City, the Indians of the
Patzicia area have strongly capitalized on the production of vegetable crops for exporto
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In a region that saw a major massacre of Indians by ladinos in 1944, the ladinos are
now finding themselves economicalIy uncompetitive with hard-working Indian
cultivators who produce more for less. There is no evidence that this economic
success has thus far provided much leverage to political power, but it seems likely that
this could be a next stage.
The development of indigenous ethnicities is, in many respects, the core
problem. Since they are deprived of advantages, special efforts are required to
improve their status. If they become weaker, they are more disadvantaged and
dependent; to become stronger, they must confront ladinos and ladinoization; they
must decide whether to be coopted into the ladino population or to maintain an Indian
identity for the possible benefit of their less successful ethnic relatives.
Third party derivative power. Development in marginalized populations is
rarely impressive and, even when it occurs, it is slow. Apart from a rapid and
successful revolution, there is only one quick way for a nondominant ethnicity to
obtain an advantageous position of power with respect to the state: it must obtain
support from a third power, an alternative source that can provide sufficient backing
that the state must, in a sense, at least pause and pay attention. In Central America this
has been used by both the ethnocratic states themselves and, in one recent instance, by
an indigenous population.
Guatemala and El Salvador have both used the argument that the presence of
socialist and Eastern European resources, the Communist threat posed by insurgent
Indians and guerrilla forces, is sufficient reason to call in all the military and economic
aid possible from the United States and Israel. The issue has never been addressed as
to whether Indians do, in fact, constitute a Communist threat. It is enough that they are
labeled as such.
In Nicaragua, where the positions are reversed, a significant sector of the
Miskito population (and some Sumu) decided to draw upon the military and CIA
support of the United States in their confrontation with the Sandinistas. The Miskito
who left the country to oppose the government initially accepted the support of the
United States, but then divided in terms of whether they wanted to be really so
dependent on what was proving to be a highly self-interested partner.
Clearly, in the 1925 Tule rebellion of the San BIas Kuna, the United States
also played a central role, but of a very different kind. In that instance, both Panama
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and the Kuna accepted the United States as a broker-a role that it played to the
advantage of the Kuna.
Nondominant ethnicities in Central America today face unattractive choice s
among third-party support, since most will inevitably be labeled as coming from the
"CIA" or "the Communists." In either case, the label can do more damage than the
good that might genuinely be forthcoming from the govemments involved. Using
such resources frames the ethnicities' polítical problems into the East-West conflict
and thereby obscures the real problems that are confronting the individual members.
Moreover, once locked into the competitive dynamics of the major powers, indigenous
groups find themselves tom by the demands of the world system with all the lethal
potential it implies.
Revolutions and rebellions. When an ethnicíty revolts, it takes on one of the
principal strategies usually reserved for the state-that is, the use of force. This is
irnmensely risky, since it requires a whole range of resources that are rarely available
to ethnicities; it also requires a degree of centralized decision making that is very
uncornmon in ethnicities.
Central America has seen many ethnic revolts. Colonial and nineteenth-century
history is replete with local and limíted regional revolts of Indian communities. The
object of these efforts, however, was rarely to displace the center of the imperial or
colonial state; much more commonly, they were expressions against the conduct of
particular agents of the state-alcaldes mayores, priests, and so on.
In the Liberal republican era, however, as the state backed the expansion of
coffee production and nationalized intervention into the customary practices of the
indigenous population, rebellions were more specifically directed against the state. The
successful Kuna rebellion in 1925 and the tragically unsuccessful Salvadoran effort in
1932 have already been recounted. In the Guatemalan case, the era since the
Depression is too complex to be detailed here, but it has been one of continuing
repression,31 including the particularly deplorable slaughter of Indians that began in
the late 1970s and lasted into the mid-1980s.32
In contrast to both the Kuna and the Salvador/Guatemala cases is the case of
the military confrontation between the Sandinista govemment and the Miskito. This,
too, is too complex to explore here, but the emerging result is that after a serious
miscalculation and misunderstanding about the nature of indigenous ethnicities, the
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of discussion is that they provide visibility to the ethnicity at both the national and the
internationallevels and serve the members as devices for seeking support for their
efforts.
Adaptive accretion. Strategies are usually conceived of as calculated plans that
are laid out in hopes of achieving a specific outcome. In fact, whíle individuals actívate
some strategies consciously, the interaction of the social structure and environment
often leads to macropatterns of which individuals may be quite unaware. For example,
whíle the Garifuna were clearly aware of their role as a militant coastal buffer between
the Spanish and English in the nineteenth century, the Miskito were not initially aware
of their being manipulated as CIA pawns.
Cultural change and adaptation, unquestionably central to the survival of an
ethnicity, is also a strategy of survival, but one that is practiced unintentionally. The
incorporation of Africans into the societies of the island Caribs (producing the Black
Caribs) and of the coastal Miskito (producing what was known colonially as the
"Zambo-Miskito") surely did not begin as an overt attempt to bring foreign elements
into the society. On a much more universal scale, the intermixture of Indians, blacks,
and whites over parts of Central America for four centuries did not follow a planned
strategy of survival for any particular ethnicity. Indeed, the creation of "mestizos,"
"zambos," and "mulattoes" probably, more than anything else, created a series of
individual s who, on the one hand, were deculturated with respect to their paren tal
societies, but who had access to more cultural variety than did either parent.
The problem of acculturation, with respect to the contemporary Indian
ethnicities, has itself been a subject of some political contention. The problem is well
illustrated by my own research history. When I began work in the early 1950s in
Guatemala, I formulated a mode¡34 (essentially derived from Redfield's folk-urban
continuum35) that was based on the idea that mestizo cultures had been expanding
over the centuries, whereas Indian cultures had been increasingly acculturated, taking
on non-Indian traits and giving up those of indigenous origino While there was much
that was true in this model, nevertheless, it did faíl to recognize the degree to which
Indians were retaining identíty and reproducing their culture and the fact that the size
of the Indian population was increasing. I carne under severe, and to some degree
merited, criticism for this modeI.36 The critique was presented in a politicized form,
arguing that my model (and, by association, the work of all American anthropologists)
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was a strategy of the United States to deculturate the Indians so that they could be
better controlled and exploited by the Guatemalan bourgeoisie.
The issue is, one hopes, not so simple. The Indian population is successfully
expanding and reproducing itself and its culture, as the census figures cited earlier
indicate. It is also the case that individual Indians are adopting the ladino lifestyle, or
encouraging their children to do so, or are simply finding that the children are doing it
in spite of efforts to stay the process.37 Communities differ in the degree to which
they have retained formal traits associated with the indigenous past; they differ in the
degree to which they have succumbed to ladinoization; and they differ in the degree to
which they apparentIy are willing to give up Indian identity. In fact, the issue that was
presented as a polemic would better serve as an agenda for research.
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